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ABSTRACT
I examine the effects of the introduction of the Spouse's Allowance to the Canadian Income
Security (IS) system on the retirement behavior of couples. This program was effectively targeted
at females in couples attempting to live on a single pension. It allowed qualifying spouses to receive
the age related benefits of the IS system at age 60, up to five years earlier than other members of the
population. This policy intervention provides an excellent opportunity to investigate how income
security programs affect the timing of retirement, and how programs targeted at one spouse can
affect the behavior of the other. The results indicate that the introduction of the Allowance is
associated with a relative increase in the labor force rates of 6 to 7 percentage points among males
in eligible couples. Eligible females did not share the rising employment rates over the 1970s









Itis widely acknowledged that the aging populations of developed countries
present one of the greater public policy challenges of the next century. Government
transfers to the aged are typically one of the fastest growing components of govern-
ment expenditure and many public pension plans are in poor fiscal health. In re-
sponse, resources have been channeled into research programs on aging and retire-
ment behavior. There is growing recognition, however, that the greater part of this
research may miss part of the story. Traditionally, the focus has been on males mod-
eled as independent decision makers. Yet the upward trend in the labor market par-
ticipation of females implies that they will be both part of the "retirement problem",
as well as any solution.
The issue, therefore, is that the retirement behavior of both males and females
is of interest, but there is just a handful of studies on this topic.' The scarcity of ap-
propriate data, the complexity of the family decision making process and the histori-
cally low labor market activity of women have meant that many of the basic charac-
teristics of couples' retirement behavior—the incidence of joint retirement, the influ-
ence of one spouse's economic opportunities on the retirement decision of the other
spouse—are unknown or have just recently been explored. If the retirement deci-
sions of couples are strongly connected, the reasons must be an important input to
any reform of social security programs. Alternatively, many social security programs
would appear to tie the retirement decisions of couples. Understanding the effects
of any incentives for joint decision making is critical to forecasting the future fiscal
balance of these programs in a labor market of dual worker families.2
Canada has a number of social security programs for seniors that would appear
1Recentresearch on the retirement behavior of couples includes Blau (1997 and 1998), Hurd
(1990), McCarty (1990), Pozzebon and Mitchell (1989) and Vistnes (1994).
2Forexample, Blau (1997) examines how the spouse benefit provision of the US Social Security
system has effects on labor market activity of both married males and females.
2to induce interdependence in labor market behavior.3 In this paper, I examine the
introduction, in the 1970s, of one of them: the Spouse's Allowance (SPA), a program
nominally designed to aid couples attempting to live on one pension. Because fe-
males tend to marry older males, and males have historically been the primary earn-
ers, many Canadian couples of limited resources found themselves in precarious cir-
cumstances at retirement. The Canadian Income Security (IS) system of the 1970s
included two age-related benefits and an earnings related public pension, all avail-
able starting at age 65. Assuming joint retirement, many couples would retire when
the male turned 65 with only his IS benefits as support. The Spouse's Allowance
made the age related benefits of the system available to individuals (typically the
female) at age 60 if they were married to someone who was 65 or older.
I examine how the introduction of this program in 1975 affected the labor mar-
ket decisions of the eligible couples. The empirical strategy is to compare (sepa-
rately) changes in retirement behavior of males (65-75) and females (60-64) who be-
came eligible for the Spouse's Allowance to that of their counterparts of the same
age, who due to the age of their spouse did not qualify for an Allowance. I also pro-
vide some evidence on joint labor market status, although a direct analysis of joint
retirement is prohibited by the lack of panel data for this period. One of the attrac-
tive features of this episode is the opportunity to analyze couples' behavior using
a policy intervention rather than cross individual variation in benefit entitlement,
which is likely correlated with unobserved determinants of labor market decisions.
It is acknowledged at that outset, that older females in the 1970s did not have
high labor market participation rates, and so the potential for any effect on their
behavior is in some sense bounded. Nevertheless, this is a period of rising female la-
bor market activity, so that that the effect of the program may have been to remove
Gruber 1997 provides a simulation analysis of the tax incentives of various Canadian income
security programs, highlighting the effects of means tested programs which are based on family income.
3women eligible for the Allowance from this trend.
The results indicate that the introduction of the program is associated with a
decrease in employment rates and increase in not in the labor force (NLF) rates
among eligible males. The preferred estimates indicate that the NLF rates of eligi-
ble males rose 6 to 7 percentage points relative to males in the control groups. They
provide further evidence of how government social security programs can influence
the retirement behavior of individuals, and how in this instance males responded to
a program which was targeted in effect at their spouses. I also observe relative re-
ductions in labor market activity among eligible females. SPA eligible females did
not share the rising employment rates of their counterparts in the control groups.
Instead, their behavior bears a strong resemblance to that of females aged 65-75
married to males 65-75. The common factor here is that these older women had ac-
cess to the age related benefits of the IS system throughout the sample period. The
introduction of the SPA put these two groups on even footing. I also provide some
evidence that the response is concentrated among individuals who are predicted to
be on the part of the budget constraint where the SPA should have its greatest ef-
fect, or more generally who have limited labor market opportunities. Finally, the
results indicate that the introduction of the program is correlated with a increase in
joint absence from the labor market among eligible couples.
2.The Canadian Income Security Programs
Canada'ssocial security system, circa the 1970's, had the same three main com-
ponents present today: the Old Age Security (OAS) pension established in 1952,
the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) established in 1967 and the Canada Pen-
sion Plan (CPP; Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) for workers in Quebec) established
The 1952 Old Age Security Act replaced legislation from 1927, through which the federal gov-
ernment shared the cost of provincial means-tested benefits for the elderly.
4in 1966. The OAS at this time was an unconditional cash benefit paid to individu-
als who satisfied age and residency requirements.5 Starting in 1970, all individuals
65 years of age or older were eligible for this benefit. The GIS was (and still is) a
means tested supplement for OAS pensioners. Benefits were not subject to regular
income tax, and there were different benefit rates for single and married persons.
Finally, the retirement portion of the CPP and QPP pensions was, with some excep-
tions, similar to its present manifestation. Benefits were calculated on the basis of
an individual's earnings history starting at age 18, and available starting at age 65
(presently benefits can be claimed as early as age 60).6 The benefits payable under
these three programs over the 1970's are graphed in figure i.7
Both OAS and CPP/QPP benefits were paid out at the individual level, and
the programs' regulations did not directly tie the retirement decisions of spouses.8
There has always been a direct interdependence, however, in the GIS program. The
amount of GIS benefits is based on family income excluding OAS and GIS benefits
and a few other exemptions. For married individuals, how benefits are taxed back
under the means test depends on whether both are pensioners. The rules in the
1970's were: 1) if both members of a couple were pensioners (65 or older), the bene-
fits of each were taxed back at a rate of 25 percent for each dollar of monthly family
income in excess of the family's combined OAS benefits (for a combined tax rate of
50 percent at the family level), and 2) if only one member of the couple was a pen-
sioner, the monthly benefit was taxed back at a rate of 25 percent for each dollar of
monthly family income in excess of the OAS pension, and the initial reduction did
There is now a clawback of benefits from high income individuals.
6 Further details of theseprograms can be found in Baker and Benjamin (1998 and 1999), Burbidge
(1987) CCH Canadian Limited (1996), Gruber (1997) and Pesando and Rea (1977).
As a point of reference, as of January 1999 the monthly OAS pension is $410.82, the maximum
CPP pension for retirement at age 65 is $751.67 and the maximum GIS benefits for single and married
individuals are $488.23 and $318.01, respectively.
8 In fact, there is some interdependence between an individual anda deceased spouse through the
survivor's benefit. The details can be found in Gruber (1997).
5not occur until annual family income exceeded roughly 12 times the monthly OAS
benefit.9
It is important to account for changes in these programs over the period the
SPA was introduced, as any reforms could complicate inference. The main changes
in the public pension programs were the elimination of the earnings test for bene-
ficiaries 65-69 from the CPP in 1975 and the QPP in 1977, and the end of the so-
called "transition period" of both programs in 1976. Baker and Benjamin (1999)
argue that the removal of the earnings test led to a significant increase in weeks
worked conditional on employment among males 65-69. Although not formally an-
alyzed, the results from that study also suggest that the end of the transition pe-
riod (1966-1975) was correlated with an increase in pension receipt for males, 65 and
older.'0 Over this period, individuals received only part of the "full pension" they
qualified for, to account for the fact they had contributed to the plan for a short
time. The pro-rating fraction rose linearly over the 10 year period, so that in Jan-
uary 1976 individuals could draw the full pension they qualified for subject to the
other rules of the plan.'1 One could imagine that some workers may have delayed
retirement until January 1976 so as to be able to draw a full pension. However, sim-
ulations of the present value of pension benefits at different retirement ages reveal
that in the early 1970s the annual increase in the pro-rating fraction was roughly
equivalent to an actuarially fair adjustment in pension benefits for delaying retire-
ment.'2 That said, in the 1970s the CPP and QPP provided no explicit actuarial
adjustment to benefits for delaying retirement beyond age 65, so with the end of the
Also, in this case an individual was eligible for the (larger) single person benefit.
10 An increase in pension receipt need not implya reduction in labor supply in the absence of
the earnings test. Unfortunately, it is difficult to isolate the labor market effects of the end of the
transition period since they are perfectly co-linear with a 1976 year effect,
Further detail is provided in Baker and Benjamin 1999 and CCH Canadian Limited (1996).
12 These simulationsare calculated for an individual turning 65 in 1972 and are available from the
author on request.
6transition period many individuals would have had a strong incentive to initiate pen-
sion receipt at that age.'3
For the OAS, the major reforms were the full indexation of benefits starting
1972, and a modification of the residency requirement in 1977. Finally, the GIS was
fully indexed in 1973.
3.The Spouse's Allowance
TheSpouse's Allowance (SPA) came into effect October 1, 1975 to supplement
the limited resources of couples living on the pension income of only one spouse, and
more recently (1985) to enhance the circumstances of elderly widows and widowers.
The program can be traced to a campaign promise of the Progressive Conservative
party in the federal election of the early summer, 1974.14 The Liberal party conse-
quently embraced a largely identical proposal, and upon winning the election incor-
porated it into their Throne Speech of September 30, 1974. The Speech was quite
specific about the proposal and in particular mentions October 1, 1975 as a target
date for implementation. The necessary amendments to the Old Age Security Act
were passed in June 1975, and the program began operations on the target date.
The original program provided benefits to individuals between the ages of 60
and 64, who were spouses of OAS pensioners. Like the GIS, benefits were means
tested on the basis of family income, and not subject to regular income taxes. The
maximum payment was equal to the sum of the OAS pension and the GIS bene-
fit at the married rate. Therefore, the SPA potentially made a couple as well off
as they would be if both members were 65 years of age or older; in effect the pro-
gram allowed qualifying spouses to receive their OAS and GIS benefits up to five
13 The exception is for individuals whose further contributions to the plans wouldimprove their
earnings histories.
The original proposal envisioned a program covering spouses aged 55-65.
7years earlier than other members of the population. The equivalency is not exact,
however, since SPA benefits were taxed back at higher rates than GIS benefits for
marginal family income. The effective tax on benefits was 75 percent for each dol-
lar of monthly family income in excess of OAS and GIS benefits. This rate was in
effect until an amount of the Allowance equivalent to an OAS pension was recov-
ered (when family income equaled 4/3's of the OAS benefit). At this point, both the
Spouse's Allowance and the pensioner's (the spouse 65 or older) GIS benefit were
taxed back at a rate of 25 percent for additional family income. Therefore, at the
family level, benefits were subject to effective tax rates in excess of 75 percent.'5
The program was revised in November 1978 and November 1979 to address
the hardship faced by beneficiaries whose spouse died.'6 Initially, if the pensioner
spouse of an individual who was collecting an Allowance died, the SPA was ter-
minated.17 The financial circumstances of the widow or widower were further im-
paired by the fact that the deceased spouse's OAS and GIS benefits would also be
lost. The widow/widower would eventually qualify for their own OAS and GIS ben-
efits, but this could be more than 4 years in the future. The program rules were
changed so that the SPA would continue to be paid to a widow/widower for at first
6 months after the death of the pensioner (1978), and subsequently until the individ-
ual reached age 65 and would qualify for his/her own OAS and GIS (1979).18
The program was subsequently revised again in 1985 to provide benefits to all
low income widows or widowers, between the ages of 60 and 64, regardless of when
their spouse died. This reform falls outside the sample period and will not be exam-
Family income for the purposes of the means test was calculated for the calendar year preceding
the fiscal year (April-March) of application. In the year of retirement, however, couples were permitted
to substitute an estimate of income for the current calendar year reflecting their new (presumably
reduced) circumstances.
16 The plight of widows and widowerswas the main objections raised by opposition parties to the
original SPA legislation.
17 The SPA also ended if the couple became separatedor divorced.
18 Under thenew rules the SPA would end if the individual re-married.
8med here.
4.The Predicted Effects of the Introduction of the Spouse's Allowance
Theeffects of the introduction of the SPA on the choice of family labor sup-
ply ina given year can be examined using the family budget constraint within the
context of a simple Becker/Mincer model of the division of labor within the house-
hold. Before the introduction of the Allowance the components of family income
are assumed to be the pensioner's OAS and GIS and any labor market earnings of
the couple. For simplicity the amounts of any CPP pension or other non labor in-
come are assumed to be zero.19 In figure 2, I graph family income against weeks of
"leisure" in a given year. The distance AB is the amount of the pensioner's OAS
pension ($1551 in 1975). ABCD is the family budget constraint in the absence of
the GIS or the SPA. It is drawn assuming the husband has comparative advantage
at market work, and that this advantage is manifest in the relative wage rates.20
The slope of BC, therefore, is WM the male's wage, while the slope of CD is the fe-
male's wage, WF.
The distance BE is the amount of the pensioner's GIS pension when the only
other income is an OAS pension ($1088 in 1975). The reduction in the GIS with
labor market earnings is drawn for a pensioner whose spouse did not qualify for a
pension. This would be the most common case for couples who would subsequently
qualify for the SPA. An initial amount of income roughly equal to the annual OAS
pension is exempt for the purposes of the GIS means test. Therefore, the segment
19 Any amounts of these sorts of income would have the effect oflowering the amount of the GIS
pension when labor market earnings equal zero (and thus also lowering the "break even" level).
20 The assumption that the male hascomparative advantage in market work is adopted for its
consistency with the traditional sexual division of market and non-market time common among older
couples of this time. The assumption that the comparative advantage is manifest in wage rates is to
retain a simple presentation within a standard labor supply diagram. A sufficient condition for this to
be true is equal absolute advantage in non market work. Alternatively, the analysis could be conducted
in a model of the allocation between market and non market goods without this simplification.
9EF has the slope WM. At point F, the marginal dollar of labor market earnings
leads to a 25 cent reduction in the GIS, and therefore the slope of FG is O,7SWM.
The GIS is completely taxed away at point G, which in 1975 was around $5903.
The introduction of the SPA shifts the budget constraint to AHIJCD. The dis-
tance EH is the amount of the SPA when labor market earnings equal zero.21 The
SPA is taxed back at a rate of 75 percent for any earnings until an amount equiva-
lent to the OAS is recovered. Therefore, the segment HI has the slope O.2SWM, Any
additional dollar of family earnings leads to a 50 cent reduction in non OAS gov-
ernment support (the pensioner's GIS and the GIS equivalent portion of the SPA)
which in 1975 totaled $1933.22 At point J all government assistance other than the
pensioner's OAS is recovered which in 1975 occurred at labor market earnings of
about $5934.
The shift in the budget constraint with the introduction of the SPA has an un-
ambiguous negative effect on labor supply. Over the segment HIJ both a substitu-
tion effect and an income effect act to reduce weeks of work, assuming leisure is a
normal good. Also, families initially locating near the break even point may have
found it optimal to reduce labor supply to qualify for some government support.
Only families who were initially a sufficient distance above point J, or had enough
other non labor income to make the GIS and SPA irrelevant would be unaffected by
the reform.23
In the diagram as drawn, any effect of the SPA would be visible in the male's
labor supply, since if both members of the couple were working they would be lo-
21 In the figure, the distance also accounts for the reduction in the pensioner's GIS, which would
now be paid out at the (lower) married person's rate.
22 The pensioner's GIS and the remaining amount of the SPA are each taxed back at a rate of 25
percent. The total non OAS support is calculated using the GIS married benefit in 1975.
23 Note if both members of the couple were to qualify for the maximum CPP benefit ($1633
annually) the GIS and SPA would be still be relevant although the break even levels would be much
lower.
10cated well above the break even point. For low wage families, however, the break
even point might be beyond the kink at point C, and therefore both male and fe-
male labor supply would be affected. Note that in dual worker families, the model as
drawn rules out any reductions of male labor supply without concurrent reductions
in the female's work.24
5.Data and Empirical Strategy
Mostof the analysis is based on the census family files of the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, from 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978 and 1980. These are retrospective
surveys conducted in April of the indicated years. Relative to individual level files,
these data exclude unmarried individuals living at home, who are of limited concern
here given the focus on the elderly. The data for Quebec are excluded from the anal-
ysis sample. As noted above, the earnings test was removed from the CPP and QPP
at different times in the period of analysis. It is convenient to treat this reform as a
common time effect, and this is most easily accomplished if the data for Quebec are
excluded.
The introduction of the Spouse's Allowance should have its primary effects on
1) individuals over the age of 64 who have spouses between the ages of 60 and 64,
and 2) these same spouses. Given the common practice of females marrying older
males, it seems reasonable to focus the analysis on males 65-75 and females between
the ages of 60-64, whose spouses' characteristics satisfy the requirements of the SPA
program.25 In each case the strategy is to compare measures of the labor market
attachment of these groups before and after the introduction of the Allowance.
This time series variation, however, is not sufficient. Clearly, there is the pos-
24 This is tosay that the individual with comparative advantage in market work should be the last
to leave the market.
25 Males older than 75 are excluded because theage variable is truncated at age 76.
11sibility of falsely attributing the labor market impacts of unobserved time effects
which are concurrent with the introduction of the Allowance, to the SPA. More gen-
erally, secular trends in the labor market behavior of these groups might also end
up a SPA effect. Finally, any effects of reforms of the CPP around the time of the
introduction of the SPA must be accommodated.
To account for these possibilities, I use the labor market behavior of individ-
uals of similar age, but whose marital circumstances render them ineligible for the
SPA as control groups. For the analysis of males I consider three control groups: 1)
males 65-75 with spouses aged 65-75, 2) males 65-75 with spouses aged 50-59 and 3)
males 65-75 who are single. In each case these men are not eligible for the SPA. In
the analysis of females the control groups are females aged 60-64 with spouses aged
1) 50-59 years and 2) 60-64 years old. In this case it is not possible to use single fe-
males, 60-64, as a control group. As noted above some of these individuals became
eligible for the SPA in 1978 and 1979 under the new provisions for widowers.
The standard objections to this "experimental" strategy are that individuals in
the different control groups might differ from their counterparts who are SPA eli-
gible in both observed and unobserved ways, there may be group-specific trends in
labor market behavior, or there may be unobserved year effects, coincident with the
introduction of the SPA, that have heterogeneous impacts across groups. Any ob-
servable differences across the groups are controlled for directly in the estimation to
extent that they are captured by characteristics available in the SCF's, while average
unobserved differences are captured by fixed effects. An investigation of any differ-
ences in trend labor market behavior can be conducted with data from the period
prior to the introduction of the SPA. A validation of the assumption of homogeneous
year effects is more difficult. In the absence of random assignment, it is important to
directly consider the suitability of the different control groups. Further justification
and criticism of the choices made here is provided in the course of the analysis.
12Some selected mean characteristics of the various groups are reported in table
1. For males, the most striking differences are in average age and the presence of
children who are enrolled full time in school, SPA eligible males are a full two years
younger than males whose spouses are 65-75, but marginally older than their coun-
terparts whose wives are 50-59. Also, this latter group of males is far more likely to
have children at home enrolled full time in school. Among the different groups of
females the largest differences are in educational attainment and urban residence.
Those with spouses aged 50-59 are more likely to have more then a primary educa-
tion and live in an urban area.
Other objections to the empirical strategy are the possibilities that individuals
anticipated the policy change, or the program was introduced in response to some
trend in the labor market behavior of the target group. As noted above, the pro-
gram gained public exposure in the federal election of 1974.26 It is probably safe to
assume that the Canadian public took the campaign promises of the various parties
with a grain of salt. The program appeared on firmer ground in the Throne Speech
of September 1974, although it is not unusual for governments to fail to implement
their entire legislative agenda before their term ends. The data I use to measure
labor market attachment before the introduction of the SPA are from April 1972
and 1974. These dates precede the dissolution of parliament on May 9, 1974 and
the subsequent election campaign in which the SPA entered public debate. Also the
social policy document that became the basis of the Progressive Conservatives' pro-
posal for a spouse's allowance was released in May 1974. Therefore, it seems reason-
able to assume that these data predate any wide public reliance on the promise of
the SPA.
The motivation for the SPA, as revealed by parliamentary debate and subse-
26 It was not, however, a dominant issue in the campaign. Thewage and price controls proposed
by the Progressive Conservative party took center stage.
13quent Standing Committee discussion, was the hardship experienced by couples at-
tempting to live on one pension.27 Opposition criticism of the legislation centered on
other needy groups among the elderly, and the fact that the program discriminated
against poor individuals who were not married. The labor market status of the tar-
get population, however, was not absent from the discussions. In fact, the Minis-
ter of National Health and Welfare, Marc Lalonde, predicted little labor market re-
sponse to the new program, stating, "The [SPA eligible] spouse is, in most cases, not
a member of the work force and highly unlikely to be employed in any case" (Honse
of Commons Debates, June 6, 1975).
To measure the effect of the introduction of the SPA on labor market behavior,
I estimate the equation
(1) Yit =
using samples of SPA eligible males or females and the various control groups from
the 1972, 1974, 1978 and 1980 SCF's. Note that data from the 1976 SCF are (ini-
tially) not used because the survey week (April 1976) is not long after the introduc-
tion of the program (October 1975). Yit is a measure of labor market behavior in
the survey reference week. Theare a set of individual level demographic vari-
ables, SPA2 is a dummy variable which equals one if an individual is eligible for the
SPA, Y72 and Y80 are year dummies that equal one in the indicated years, and
Y78 =1in years 1978 and later (the SCF years that the Spouse's Allowance was
available). Therefore,provides the an estimate of the difference in the change in
the dependent variable, yj, between individuals who were eligible for the SPA and
those in the control group, as the new program was introduced. The measures of la-
bor market attachment examined (yit) are employment and not in the labor force
rates in the reference week.
27 See 30th Parliament (1975) and Standing Committee on Health, Welfare and Social Affairs
(1975).
14Two specifications of (1)areestimated. In the first, the Xconsistof a full set
of province effects (the base specification). In the second, I add dummy variables
for single year age categories, education, urban residence, and for individuals who
have any children enrolled full time at school (expanded specification) 28 As noted
above, individuals who were eligible for the SPA could differ from those in the con-
trol group in unobserved ways. This argument extends directly to observable dif-
ferences, so the results from the expanded specification provide an important check
on the inference. Finally, all estimation is weighted least-squares using SCF sample
weights, and the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity following the
method of White (1980).
6.An Overview of the Data
Infigure 3, I graph an estimate of the incidence of the Spouse's Allowance in
the 1970's using administrative data.29 Information on SPA beneficiaries is avail-
able for the fiscal year ending March 31. On the assumption that the overwhelming
majority of them are female, I divide this number by calendar year estimates of the
population of females aged 60-64. The proportion of the "eligible population" receiv-
ing a SPA climbs quite quickly in 1976 when the program is established, and settles
in the 14 to 16 percent range by the end of the decade. In the SCF data, roughly 30
percent of women aged 60-64 are spouses of males 65 and older and thus eligible for
the SPA in this period. Therefore, by the end of the decade an upper bound esti-
mate is that over one-half SPA eligible females are collecting the Allowance.
A view of labor supply over the period is provided in figures 4 and 5. In figure
4, I graph the proportion of females aged 60-64 who are out of the labor force in the
28 Variable definitions are provided in the appendix.
29 Note the data include the province of Quebec which is excluded from the regression analysis. The
data on SPA beneficiaries is from Human Resources Development Canada (1994). The population of
females aged 60-64 is taken from CANSIM
15reference week. For females eligible for the SPA this rate is fairly constant over the
sample period. In contrast the rate falls sharply for females with spouses 60-64 or
50-59. The profile for women with spouses 50-59 is somewhat erratic. This partly
reflects small sample sizes: this group makes up only 7 percent of females 60-64 (an-
nual sample sizes range by year from 82 to 136). Also, the composition of the group
changes dramatically over the period. For example, the proportion with only a pri-
mary education rises from 29 percent in 1971 to 51 percent in 1977. This suggests
that the time trends in the raw data could reflect composition effects, and that the
conditional means from the regression analysis should be more informative.
The SPA was introduced just prior to the survey date in 1976. Therefore, the
data for 1972 and 1974 provide a limited opportunity to compare labor market trends
prior to the introduction of the program. Figure 4 suggests the trends for the SPA
eligible group and women with spouses aged 60-64 were very similar in this period.
In fact a regression of the NLF rate on group specific year effects confirms there is
no economically or statistically significant differences in the 1972—1974 changes in
rates between these two groups.3° In contrast, the NLF rate for women with spouses
50-59 was already trending downward before the introduction of the SPA. A regres-
sion analysis indicates that the difference here is also not statistically significant,
but this has much to do with the imprecision of the estimates. As noted above the
composition of this groups changes significantly over the period and this might lie
behind the difference in trends.
Using the experience of women with spouses aged 60-64 as the counterfactual,
the graph suggests that the availability of the SPA is associated with a relative in-
crease in the proportion not in the labor force. Starting in 1976, women who could
collect the SPA did not share the falling NLF rates of their counterparts in the con-
30
Usingthe pooled sample, the regression is of the NLF rate on year dummy variables for 1972,
1976, 1978 and 1980, a dummy variable for the women with spouses aged 60-64, and a full set of
interactions of this dummy with the year effects.
16trol groups.
The evidence for males is presented in figure 5. Again a comparison of labor
market trends prior to the introduction of the SPA reveals a fair bit of homogeneity
across groups. A regression analysis confirms this inference as all inter-group dif-
ferences in the 1972—1974 changes are small and statistically insignificant. A com-
parison of the post 1975 trends, suggests an impact of the SPA although it differs
somewhat across the control groups. There appears to be a common element to the
1974—1976 and 1978—1980 changes for SPA eligible males and males with spouses 50-
59. One reason for some similarity in 1974—1976 change is the end of the transition
period of the CPP in December 1975. This end date was known well in advance (10
years) so that anyone delaying retirement to this point in time might be expected to
have acted fairly quickly. In the comparisons to the other two control groups the
SPA eligible males experience relative increases in NLF rates in both 1974—1976
and 1976-1978. If the preceding reasoning is correct, then it follows that the end
of the transition period had limited effect on these other two groups. This is cer-
tainly plausible since, as shown in table 1, men in these two groups are older, and in
one case have older spouses. Given limited lifespans and declining health with age,
the incentives to delay retirement until the end of the transition period were greater
for males in their mid to late sixties than those in their seventies. That said, it will
be important in the regression analysis to make some control for these relative dif-
ferences in the 1974-1976 changes across groups so as not to attribute them to the
SPA.
These graphs suggest that the SPA may have had some effect on the labor sup-
ply decisions of the affected males and females separately. In figures 6 and 7, I present
some evidence of joint labor supply. In figure 6, I graph the proportion of couples
in which each member is NLF by the different comparison groups for the analysis
of females. There is only modest evidence here that the introduction of the SPA
17is correlated with an increase in this behavior. Stronger evidence is available for
males. Here there is a clear, relative increase in joint absence from the labor mar-
ket in couples eligible for the Allowance. Also, the SPA eligible couples and males
with spouses aged 50-59 share common trends in NLF rates prior to the introduction
of the SPA.
7.Results
Inthe first panels of tables 2 and 3, I present the estimates of the parameter on
from equation (1) from both the base and expanded specifications. The
results for males, in the first panel of table 2 tell a fairly consistent story. Relative
to each control group, men eligible for the SPA experienced a relative increase in
their NLF rate and decrease in their employment rate with the introduction of the
program. Regardless of specification or control group, the changes in the employ-
ment and NLF rates are nearly equal and opposite in sign signaling that movements
in or out of unemployment are not part of picture.3' There is also broad agreement
across the three control groups, with smaller estimates obtained relative to males
with the youngest wives (aged 50-59). This is consistent with the evidence in figure
5. It is possible that the estimates using single men or males with older spouses also
capture the effect of the end of the CPP transition period on SPA eligible males.
This effect is more accurately netted out in the comparison to males married to
females aged 50-59. Finally, the addition of demographic characteristics in the ex-
panded specification has relatively little effect on the results.
In addition to the end of the transition period, the abolition of the CPP earn-
ings test in January 1975 could also complicate inference. Baker and Benjamin (1999)
show that the abolition of the earning test is associated with increases in employ-
This result is confirmed in separate estimates (not shown) for reference week unemployment
rates.
18ment rates and decreases in NLF rates. Therefore, in contrast to any effects of the
end of the transition period, the effects of this reform should work in the opposite
direction, attenuating rather than enhancing the estimated SPA effect. Both these
events would have affected males who were eligible for the SPA and those in the var-
ious controls groups. Therefore, the net effect of these reforms should be captured
in the estimate of the parameter on Y78 (the common year effect) assuming it is the
same across these groups. The removal of the earnings test, however, only affected
males between the ages of 65 and 69. Also, as argued above, the end of the transi-
tion period might be expected to have had larger effects on younger males. While
I do control directly for age in the expanded specification, there are no interactions
between the age dummies and the year effects. Therefore, to accommodate age spe-
cific responses to the CPP reforms I add the interaction between Y78t and A6569
to (1), where A6569 =1if the individual is 65 to 69 years old (the age range af-
fected by the removal of the earnings test). The parameter on this variable is identi-
fied by any common change in labor supply for all males of these ages in the sample.
The results of this modification, reported in the second panel of table 2, are
consistent with the arguments presented in the discussion of figure 5. The larger
changes in the estimates of are for the samples using single men or men
with spouses aged 65-75 as a control. The fact that there is little change in the esti-
mates using males with spouses aged 50-59 supports the argument that the common
part of the 1974—1976 changes in NLF rates of this group and SPA eligible males re-
flects the CPP reforms that had larger effects on younger males. The estimates of
both the A6569 .Y78interaction and of SPA .Y78are now remarkably similar
across groups.
A further refluement of this iuference is presented in the third panel. Here I add
the data for 1976 and use it to identify any effects of the removal of the earnings
test and the end of the transition period. I add the year effect Y761 to (1), where
19Y76 =1in the years 1976 and later, as well as the interaction A65692 Y76
(but delete A65692 Y78t). The earnings test was removed in January 1975, so
any effects should be apparent by April 1976 when the 1976 SCF was conducted. As
noted above, the transition period ended December 1975 but since the end date was
well known, anyone delaying retirement to this point in time might be expected to
have acted fairly quickly. I continue to identify the effect of the SPA with the pa-
rameter on SPA Y78, thus ignoring any response to this program which might
be present in the 1976 data. This specification, therefore, takes a more extreme ap-
proach to accommodating the possibility the 1974-1976 change captures the CPP
reforms, by discarding its contribution to the estimation of SPA Y78.
The resulting estimates of SPA .Y78are smaller again. The estimate of the
relative increase in the NLF rate now ranges in a tight band of 6 to 7 percentage
points. Also, the estimates of the A6569 interaction display similar changes.
Corresponding results for females are presented in table 3. Note that the iden-
tification of the SPA effect here is problematic. The primary strategy is compare
labor supply changes across females 60-64 whose spouses are 65-75 and thus eligi-
ble for the SPA, and their counterparts of the same age whose spouses are younger
(60-64, and 50-59). In contrast to the analysis in table 2, however, the couples in the
control groups are not only ineligible for the SPA, but also due to their ages unaf-
fected (at least immediately) by the CPP reforms. Therefore, a simple comparison
of labor supply across the groups could potentially confound the effects of all three
reforms.
The base estimates for females in the first four columns of the top panel of table
3 are largely consistent with the initial results for males using the single males and
males with spouses 65-75 as control groups. The estimated relative increase in the
NLF rate is 10 or 11 percentage points. In contrast to the results in table 2, how-
ever, the estimates of SPA .Y78tare somewhat larger once the interaction for
20couples in which males are 65-69 is added (panel 2). Note that these males are only
present in SPA eligible couples, so that in this specification the effect of the SPA is
identified by a comparison of females with spouses 70-75 and those in the control
groups. Also, in this case the estimates of A6569 .Y78are of opposite sign of the
estimates of SPA Y78 although all statistically insignificant at conventional lev-
els. It is likely that both the removal of the CPP earnings tests and the end of the
CPP transition period had limited direct effects on these females dues to their low
employment rates.
In the third panel of the table the data for 1976 are added. The resulting esti-
mates are smaller, and compare favourably to the results for males from this specifi-
cation. The estimated relative increase in the NLF rate is 7 to 9 percentage points,
while all the estimates of A656921 .Y76are very close to zero. The reason for these
changes in the estimates can be seen in figure 4. The NLF rates of SPA eligible fe-
males and the control groups start to deviate with the 1974-1976 changes. By dis-
carding this part of the post-SPA relative differences I obtain a smaller estimate.
Because isolating the effect of the SPA on females is problematic, it is worth
examining another identification strategy. It is possible to partly replicate the strat-
egy used for males by exploiting variation across age groups. For example, one com-
parison that may be informative is of SPA eligible females to females aged 50-59
who are also married to males aged 65-69. The age of the husbands is the same for
each group, so it is more straightforward to capture any effects of the CPP reforms
(possibly through the husband). Also, because the ages of the wives differ, only the
couples in which the wife is 60-64 qualify for the SPA. Finally, the females in each
group were not eligible for any IS benefits prior to the introduction of the SPA. The
downside to this approach is the possibility of attributing age specific labor market
shocks to the introduction of the Allowance. Also, any dynamic effects of the intro-
21duction of the SPA on the younger females would bias the results.32
The results using females 50-59 (married to males 65-75) as a control group are
reported in the final two columns of table 3. The estimates of the increase in the
NLF rate are smaller using this strategy, and comparable to the results for males.
With the introduction of the data for 1976, however, the estimated parameter for
the NLF rate is roughly the same size as its standard error.
In figure 8 I plot the NLF rates for females in this new control group. A com-
parison to figure 4 reveals that the identification of the SPA effect is essentially the
same regardless of the comparison. In 1974—1976 the NLF rates in the control groups
start to fall while they remain constant for the SPA eligible females. The decrease is
relatively smaller and concentrated in the 1974-1976 period for females aged 50-59
married to males aged 65-75. Therefore for females the SPA effect is essentially that
they did not share the increase in labor market activity experienced by other women
their own age, and younger women married to spouses of similar age, with the in-
troduction of the new program. Prior to this point, the four groups shared similar
labor market trends.
I also graph the NLF rates of females aged 65-75 married to men 65-75. These
women were not eligible for the SPA, but in this case the program would be super-
fluous. Due to their age, they were eligible for GIS and OAS benefits thronghont the
sample period. Therefore, with the introduction of the SPA the eligible females gain
access to the resonrces already available to this group. It is interesting, therefore,
that this group also does not show any sign of the time effect in 1974—1976 which
sent the NLF rates in the other comparison gronps falling.33 In fact, the changes
NLF rates for this gronp are very similar to those of SPA eligible females through-
32Anadditional age based comparison is available: females in SPA eligible couples to 65-75 year
old females who are married to 65-75 year old males. This comparison is taken up below.
Estimates of equation (1) using the group of females aged 65-75 married to males 65-75 as a
control confirms this result. In these regressions the estimate of the SPA Y78u interaction is
consistently small and statistically insignificant.
22out the sample period. What distinguishes these two groups from the others is the
resources represented by the SPA. The inference here is that these resources are the
common factor that "kept" these two groups from sharing the trend towards greater
participation in the labor market exhibited by the women in the other three control
groups.34
The results so far are for the aggregate effect of the SPA on labor market be-
havior. The analysis in figure 2, however, suggests that the effects will be concen-
trated among individuals with income below the break even point.35 Therefore, a re-
finement of the inference is possible if couples in this region of the budget constraint
can be isolated within both the SPA eligible group and the various control groups.
To attempt this, I draw samples of males 65-75 with spouses 50-75, and females
60-64 with spouses 50-75, from the 1971 Canadian Census, excluding couples liv-
ing in Quebec, and in which one or both of the individuals are self employed.36 For
each sample, I estimate a regression of measures of the couple's combined income
on dummy variables for their (single year) age and education, as well as province ef-
fects, using a tobit specification.37 I then use the estimated equation to predict 1970
income for couples in the SCF data sets.38 Finally, I define a dummy variable BE
whichequals 1 if predicted earnings are less than or equal to the break even level
in 1975 adjusted to 1970 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. I do not want to
use the actual 1970 break even level, because as can been seen in figure 1 both OAS
SPA eligible females and these older women also share being married to males who are eligible
for all the benefits of the Canadian IS system, but this is also true of the females aged 50-59 married
to males 65-75.
As noted above, some individuals above the break even point may have the incentive lower labor
supply to receive benefits.
36 This exclusionwas imposed to address the transitory large and small (i.e., negative) earnings of
these individuals.
There are couples with negative income under the different measures I use. They are always less
than 0.7 percent of the sample, however.
38 PEI was not included in the publicuse sample of the 1971 census. I use the province effect
for Nova Scotia to predict income for individuals from this province in the SCFs. Note a very small
number of observations are from this province (generally 0.5 to 0.8 percent per year).
23and GIS benefits increase substantially in real terms in the early 1970s. Note that I
temporarily drop the single meu as a control group at this point to focus on a more
homogeneous group for the income predictions.
The tax-back of SPA benefits circa 1975, is based on income calculated accord-
ing to the income tax act, less any OAS or GIS benefits and any benefits payable
under provincial programs for the elderly. The most detailed income variables in the
1971 census are for the census family, which may include monies attributable to in-
dividuals other than the couple, and thus not included in "family income" as defined
by the program. Also, many of these variables combine "taxable" and "non-taxable"
sources of income. At the individual level, the only income variables are employ-
ment income and total income.39 Given these constraints, I use two measures of the
couples taxable resources in the estimation. The first is simply the sum of the em-
ployment income of each spouse ("Predicted Earnings"). In the second, I add to this
the family income "from other sources" ("Predicted Income"), which includes bond
and deposit interest, dividends, other investment income, retirement pensions from
previous employment and other income (mortgage interest, net rents, estate income
or interest or cash dividends from insurance policies). One concern is this last cate-
gory, which can be positive or negative, may contain a large transitory component.
Another is that this variable will overestimate the income from other sources for the
couple, due to the presence of other family members. Given that the simple sum of
employment income most likely underestimates the taxable resources of the couple,
these two measure may be viewed to bracket the object of interest.40
The dummy variable BE is added to equation (1) along with its interactions
with the year effects and the SPA .Y78interaction. The resulting equation is
These limitations of the census data are also true of the SCF's of the early 1970s.
40 One obvious exclusion is CPP benefits, which are part of taxable income under the Act. In the
census CPP benefits are combined with OAS and GIS benefits. Nineteen seventy was in the middle
of the CPP transition period and thus the average CPP benefit was relatively small.
24estimated using the expanded set of control variables as well as the A6569 Y78
interaction. The estimates for individuals above the break even point, as well the
estimates for individuals below the break even point relative to this base response,
are reported in table 4. The results using Predicted Earnings display some agree-
ment with expectations. For example, the results for males using males 65-75 with
spouses 50-59 as a control indicate the response to the SPA is almost exclusively
among those below the break even point. The estimates for those above the break
even point are wrong signed and statistically insignificant. In contrast, the results
using males 65-75 with spouses 65-75 as a control suggest there is little to distin-
guish individuals by their predicted position on the budget constraint. Some of the
results for females would appear to contradict the predictions in figure 2. Using fe-
males aged 60-64 with spouses 60-64 as the control group, it would appear that it is
individuals who are above the break point who are driving the aggregate results. It
is only using the control group of females aged 50-59 with spouses aged 65-75 that
the interactions have the expected sign.
The results using Predicted Income are generally less supportive. All of the re-
sults for males now suggest there is little to distinguish the responses of males above
or below the break even point. The results for females shift in a similar direction:
the results using the control groups with females aged 60-64 are even more puzzling,
and the change in the results using females aged 50-59 are similar to the changes ob-
served for males.
In attempting to interpret these results it is useful to consider the proportion of
each group predicted to be at or below the break even point in each group. These
are reported in table 5. Not surprisingly, the proportions using Predicted Earnings
are generally higher than those using Predicted Income. One thing to note is that
the proportions for females 60-64 with spouses younger than 65 are very small by ei-
ther definition of income. It would appear that earnings are strongly correlated with
25the age of the husband, reflecting most likely their role as primary earners in these
cohorts. As a consequence, it is not clear that these are "good" control groups for
this purpose. The females aged 50-59 with spouses aged 65-75 exhibit proportions
below the break even point that are comparable to those of SPA eligible couples,
and thus are a better match in this dimension.
Lining up the changes in the proportions by the definition of predicted family
resources in table 5, with the changes in the results in table 4, it appears that the
response to the SPA is concentrated in a group that excludes very high earners. Fur-
ther refinement that focuses on a more select group of individuals with modest fi-
nancial resources (i.e., using Predicted Income) is not meaningful, however. There is
some evidence, therefore, that the effect of the SPA is primarily within a group with
more limited labor market opportunities.
While the preceding results suggest the introduction of the SPA was correlated
with decreased labor market activity of eligible males, and to a lesser extent eligi-
ble females, it does not provide any information on the joint labor market status of
household members. In table 6, I present the results of re-estimating some versions
of (1) substituting measures of joint labor market behavior as the dependent vari-
able. The variables examined are joint employment and NLF rates as of the survey
week. The analysis is conducted for the different comparison groups from tables 2
and 3 (excluding single males). Note that identification here is somewhat different
than in the preceding results. For example, consider the estimates for SPA eligible
couples using couples where the female is 60-64 and the male is 50-59 as the control
group. Any change in the behavior of SPA eligible females is identified the same way
as in the corresponding results in table 3 (i.e., relative to females of the same age).
The identification of any change in behavior of SPA eligible males, however, does not
have a counterpart in table 2. Here the comparison is across males of different ages
(males 65-75 to males 50-59) where in table 2 the age of the males is held constant.
26Therefore, the estimates for the joint labor market variables are not a simple map-
ping of the preceding inference.
The estimates in table 6 indicate that the introduction of the SPA is associated
with a decrease in joint employment and increase in joint absence from the labor
market, although in some cases the estimates are imprecise. Note that the estimated
reductions in joint activity are generally larger using the female control groups. Per-
haps the most convincing results shonld be the estimates using the control group
males 65-75 married to females 50-59. Here the labor market activity of SPA eligible
males is measured relative to the group that the preceding argument establishes as
most likely, to net out the effects of contemporaneous reforms of the CPP. Likewise,
the discussion of table 5 suggests that the 50-59 year old women provide the best
comparison group for SPA eligible females.
Of course the estimates in table 6 do not signal joint retirement. It is not pos-
sible to directly measure joint retirement without panel data, which do not exist for
this time period. The results in table 6 may be consistent with joint withdrawal, but
needn't imply it. For example, the increase in joint absence from the labor market
could arise from the retirement of men in couples where the wife does not work. In
fact, this result is suggested by the absolute increase in NLF rates for SPA eligible
males (figure 5) and relatively constant NLF rates for SPA eligible females (figures 4
or 8).
8.Conclusions
Iexamine the effect of the introduction of the Spouse's Allowance, to Canada's
Income Security system, on the retirement behavior of couples. This episode pro-
vides an opportunity to analyze couples' behavior on the basis of a policy interven-
tion rather than relying on cross individual/couple variation in benefit entitlement,
which is likely correlated with other unobserved determinants of labor market deci-
27sions.
The Allowance provided an unambiguous incentive for individuals in eligible
couples to withdraw from the labor market. I provide evidence the males and fe-
males in these couples responded to these incentives in the form of (relative) de-
creases in their employment rates and increases in their NLF rates. For males there
is an absolute increase in the NLF rate, while SPA eligible females did not share the
rising labor market participation rates of their counterparts in the control groups.
Also, the changes in labor market activity are concentrated among individuals who
have limited labor market opportunities. Finally, I provide some evidence of changes
in joint labor market status with the policy reform. Decreases in joint employment




The data are extracted from the 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978 and 1980 Census Family
Files. The base working samples are males aged 65-75 married to females aged 50-
75, and females aged 60-64 married to males aged 50-75. Variable Definitions:
1. Employment and Not in the Labor Force (NLF) rates: constructed from mea-
sured labor force activity in the reference week (in April of the relevant year).
2. Age: single age dummy variables are constructed from the continuous age vari-
able over the range 15-75.
3. Education: dummy variables are coded for a) 9 or 10 years of elementary and
secondary, b) 11-13 years of elementary or secondary, c) some post-secondary or
completed certificate or diploma, d) university degree. No schooling or elemen-
tary is the excluded category.
4. Urban Residence: a dummy variable is coded for individuals living in cities with
population >30,0000.
5. Children Enrolled Full-Time: a dummy variable is coded for individuals with
children up to age 24 attending school full-time.
Canadian Census, 1971
Data are extracted by the same sample definitions used for the SCF. A couple's
earnings are defined as the sum of each spouse's total income from employment, ex-
cluding observations where either spouse is coded as self-employed (using the "Class
of worker" variable). A couple's income is constructed by adding "Total family in-
come from other sources" to this sum. All other variables are defined as their SCF
counterparts.
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Males 65-75, Employed 0.03 1 -0.138 -0.061 -0.011
Spouses 50-59













Males 65-75, Employed -0.090 0.006 -0.069 0.006
Spouses 65-75





























Females 60-64, Employed -0.122 0.080 -0.132 0.133
Spouses 60-64













Females 50-59, Employed -0.001 -0.043 -0.038 0.024
Spouses 65-75













Notes: Source: 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978 and 1980 census family files of the SCF. Standard errors in parentheses.
Observations for Quebec are deleted. The estimating equation includes single age dummies, urban residence
indicator, 4 education categories, a dummy variable for the presence of any children who are enrolled full time in
school, province effects, year effects for 1972 and 1980 and dummy variables for individuals in SPA eligible
couples, individuals with predicted earnings below the "break even" point, for observations in 1978 or later (plus
interactions), and an interaction between the 1978 dummy and a dummy variable for males aged 65-6. Sample sizes
are reported in table 1.Table 5: The Incidence of Predicted Earnings At or Below the "Break Even" Point for Selected
Samples
Predicted Earnings Predicted Income
Males 65-75 with Spouses 60-64 (SPA Eligible) 0.807 0.406
Males 65-75 with Spouses 50-59 0.697 0.42 1
Males 65-75 with Spouses 65-75 0.957 0.640
Females 60-64 with Spouses 65-75 (SPA Eligible) 0.796 0.463
Females 60-64 with Spouses 50-59 0.077 0.047
Females 60-64 with Spouses 60-64 0.108 0.043
Females 50-59 with Spouses 65-75 0.697 0.421
Notes: Source: 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978 and 1980 census family files of the SCF. Observations for Quebec
are deleted. The reported statistics are the proportion (SCF sample weights) of the indicated samples (all
years) with predicted 1970 earnings below the break even point. The break even point is defined by the
SPA and GIS benefit levels in 1975 converted to 1970 dollars using the Consumer Price Index ($4165).
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Figure 5: NLF Rates for Males Aged 65-75
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